CHAPTER XXXVI - LIMITATION FOR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF
CERTAIN OFFENCES
467. Definitions —
For
the purposes of this Chapter, unless the context otherwise, requires,
"period of limitation"
means
the period specified in section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence.
468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of
limitation.
(1)
Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take
cognizance of an
offence
of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of
limitation.
(2)
The period of limitation shall be—
(a)
six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b)
one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one
year;
(c)
three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term
exceeding one
year
but not exceeding three years.
(3)
For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to
offences which may be
tried
together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable
with the
more
severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.
Comments
(i)
Once the limitation has begun to run, it runs its full course; Venkappa Gurappa Hosur v.
Kasawwa, (1997) 4 Supreme 217.
(ii)
Sub-section (3) of section 468 which was added by Cr. P (Amendment Act), 1978
provides
that
in relation to offences which may be tried together, the period of limitation
shall be tried
together,
the period of limitation shall be determined with reference to the offence
which is
punishable
with the more or most severe punishment. The language of sub-section (3) of
section
468
makes it imperative that the limitation provided for taking cognizance in section
468 is in
respect
of offence charged and not in respect of offence finally proved; State of Himachal
Pradesh v. Tara Dutta, AIR 2000 SC 297.
(iii)
When the respondents were charged under section 468 read with 120 B per which
the
impossible
punishment is 7 years and section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1947,
which
is
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years and for
such offences
no
period as limitation having been provided for in section 468, the cognizance
taken by Special
Judge
cannot said to be barred by limitation; State
of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutta, AIR
2000
SC 297.
469. Commencement of the period of limitation.
(1)
The period of limitation, in relation to an offence, shall commence,—
(a)
on the date of the offence; or
(b)
where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by
the
offence
or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the
knowledge
of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c)
where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which
the
identity
of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the
police
officer
making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.
(2)
In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed
shall be
excluded
470. Exclusion of time in certain cases.
(1)
In computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has
been prosecuting
with
due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of first instance or in a
Court of
appeal
or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded:
Provided
that no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same
facts
and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or
other cause
of
a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2)
Where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an offence has been
stayed by an
injunction
or order, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of the
continuance of
the
injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on
which it was
withdrawn,
shall be excluded.
(3)
Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where , under any
law for the
time
being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the
Government
or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for
an
offence,
than, in computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as
the case may
be,
the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.
Explanation.—In computing the time required for obtaining the consent or
sanction of the
Government
or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining
the
consent
or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other
authority shall
both
be excluded.
(4)
In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the offender—
(a)
has been absent from the India or from any territory outside India which is
under the
administration
of the Central Government, or
(b)
has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded.
471. Exclusion of date on which Court is closed.
Where
the period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed, the Court
may take
cognizance
on the day on which the Court reopens.
Explanation.—A Court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning
of this
section,
if, during its normal working hours, it remains closed on that day.
472. Continuing offence.
In
the case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to
run at every
moment
of the time during which the offence continues.
473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.
Notwithstanding
anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may
make
cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitations, if it
is satisfied on the
facts
and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained
or that it is
necessary
so to do in the interests of justice.
COMMENTS
(i)
It is not necessary to decide whether the extension of period of limitation
under section 473
must
precede of taking of cognizance of the offence; Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory of
Arunachal Pradesh (Now State),
1988 Cr LJ 1803: AIR 1988 SC 1729.
(ii)
Whenever a Magistrate invokes the provision and condones the delay the order of
Magistrate
must
indicate that he was satisfied on the facts and circumstances of case that the
delay has been
properly
explained and necessary to condone delay; State
of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutta,
AIR
2000 SC 297.
